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The current shutdown of the U.S. federal government is the longest in its history.
It began on December 22, 2018, and at the time of writing (at 28 days), there is no
end in sight1)At the time of this entry’s post, we await the outcome of two updates:
House Democrats have increased their compromise package for border security
by $1 billion; Trump has promised a “major announcement”.. It has now easily
outlasted the previous record, of the Clinton vs. Republican-controlled Congress
standoff of 1995 (21 days) over budgeting disagreements, as well as the Obama vs.
Republican-controlled Senate standoff of 2013 (16 days) over the Patient Protection
and Affordable Health Care Act. The two previous shutdowns under President Trump
were minor, over immigration and budget caps (in January and February 2018, two
days and a few hours, respectively). This one concerns Trumps vs. the Democrat-
controlled House. 
The two branches’ disagreement lies ostensibly with border security. President
Trump has demanded at least $5 billion to pay for a concrete, sea-to-sea border
wall with Mexico. Democrats have offered a compromise of $1.6 billion towards
border security, which Trump has rejected. The Democratic Party sees the wall as a
waste of money and immoral; many congressional representatives do not see border
security as a priority, and even among those who do (including the sole Republican
representative of a borderland state), preferred options include “smarter” ideas,
such as tracking technology and drones. Certainly, the border “chaos” reported by
Trump is not borne out by the facts, unless one records, as one Texas congressional
representative did, the personal crises endured by would-be immigrants at the
border, which would not be ended by a wall.
Yet the disagreement is, to some extent, beside the point; the constitutional
implications are also pressing. There is an intricate backdrop of constitutional
and broader public law that governs such shutdowns and the “funding gaps” that
give rise to them. These “gaps” arise in one of two ways: either as a result of the
Congress failing to pass legislation funding government operations and agencies,
or as a result of the President’s veto, after Congress has passed such a bill. (The
latter now applies to the present shutdown.) While many government programs
(such as Social Security) are supported by annual appropriations acts, shutdowns
affect those that rely on continuing appropriations. As I have written previously,
such shutdowns are unique to the check-and-balances understanding of American
presidentialism.2)Katharine G. Young, American Exceptionalism and Government
Shutdowns: A Comparative Constitutional Reflection on the 2013 Lapse in
Appropriations, 94 Boston University Law Review 991 (2014). They have a number
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of causes, including an obdurate Constitution which did not put its mind to political
parties and to their polarization. Other laws include the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974, which “impounds” funds absent prior congressional authorization, and the
Antideficiency Act, the earliest version of which was enacted in 1870, and then 1884,
but which was “rediscovered” in 1980. Two influential executive opinions from that
time, by then-Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, interpreted the Act as requiring a
shutdown of all “non-essential” government functions unless new spending bills were
passed. That history provides an interesting case study of legalism in the US, yet to
be concluded. 
Hence, the current shutdown is partial, and affects 800,000 federal workers, many of
whom who have little savings to fall back on; they and the economy are feeling the
pain, with a half a percentage point of growth already lost. And while federal workers
have received some legislated support, including back pay guarantees, government
contractors will not, risking their businesses and depressing the economy further.
The wider and even more disturbing picture concerns other impacts: the long-term
impact of shuttered government on basic government functions: how it collects data
and advances science, monitors environmental and health hazards, dispenses
nutrition programs for families needing assistance, collects and returns taxes,
and attracts new hires. And in two weeks, funding for the federal courts may be in
jeopardy. 
The extensive duration of this partial shutdown is thus of great alarm. Of course,
Americans are no stranger to government shutdowns: they have occurred, to
lesser or greater duration and disruption, on 21 occasions since 1974. They are a
predictable result of a backdrop of constitutional and public law easily manipulated
by party polarization. And yet, the present government shutdown represents a new
step forward to the precipice on which Trump is taking America’s constitutional
democracy, which makes it distinctive for reasons not just of duration.
First, this shutdown occurs alongside major regressions in America’s constitutional
democracy, as Trump continues to reject norms of mutual tolerance and restraint
already in jeopardy prior to his appointment. The culture of congressional politics
has long been “abysmal”, and is progressively worsening. But as Stephen Levitsky
and Daniel Ziblatt have documented, Trump is a “serial norm-breaker”, who has
little concern with small-c constitutional norms, as well as with the reciprocity and
compromise required for government to work.3)Steven Levitsy and Daniel Ziblatt,
How Democracies Die (Crown: United States, 2018). This means that the game-of-
chicken that is always the basic premise of a government shutdown, in which the
side that ends the shutdown is often the side that feels the greatest political heat,
is already highly distorted. Trump has issued many falsehoods about the border
chaos and the proclivities of federal workers, but alongside these is the more general
absence, in Trump, of any sense that “lying is a disfavored behaviour”. Given that
the narrative of who-is-to-blame for the shutdown is a critical piece for ending the
manoeuvre (although recent polls report that the majority think that blame lies with
the president), the present shutdown appears potentially endless.
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Second, even if the shutdown may be thought to involve intransigent Democrats
as well as an intransigent Trump, it is not symmetrical. As David Pozen and
Joseph Fishkin have recently written,4)Joseph Fishkin & David Pozen, Asymmetric
Constitutional Hardball, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 915 (2018) adapting a term first coined
by Mark Tushnet,5)Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev.
523, 523 (2004) shutdowns are versions of “asymmetrical constitutional hardball”
in which the costs to the Democrats and the costs to Republicans of “pushing
the constitutional envelope” with respect to previous norms of fair play, are not
equal. With their anti-tax, small government ideals, and the “originalist”, pre-New
Deal constitutional philosophy, many Republicans have a greater willingness to
incapacitate the government. This also makes a more enduring shutdown more
likely. Indeed, the recent manoeuvres to allow more federal workers to function may
ironically prolong the standoff, given that many sources of voter ire will be kept in
check. (Democrats could, of course, back down, and hope for the political costs of
an unpopular wall to do their work in the next election: Mark Graber draws on an
1832 veto involving Andrew Jackson and Nicholas Biddle to prove the plausibility
of this option, which of course relies on voter sentiment, as well as electoral
responsiveness in the first place.)
And finally, the shutdown of government is now bound up in a shrewd escalation
by Trump of the constitutional stakes. Last week, he threated to declare a “national
emergency” to fund his wall; the option has been tempered, but apparently not
been discarded. While such a move would immediately end the shutdown, it would
also threaten previously understood norms governing constitutional emergency.
Such powers – exacerbated by the perils of presidentialism famously described by
Juan Linz in relation to Latin America’s democratic breakdowns in the 1970s6)Juan
J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. Democracy 51 (1990). For an analysis
of prominent assessments of this danger (pre-Trump), by Ackerman, Posner
and Vermeule, and Shane, see William E. Scheuerman, Review: Emergencies,
Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy, 37
Law & Social Inquiry 743 (2012). – have been seen as off the table – or expressly
repudiated – by US leaders. If they are invoked under the pretext of border control,
they may threaten a constitutional crisis (as Bruce Ackerman has suggested, noting
the federal crimes that are suggested by this unprecedented move) – or at the very
least indicate a vastly imprudent reinterpretation of appropriations law (as John
Fabien Witt has argued.) 
Yet irrespective of whether Trump invokes an emergency power for his wall, each
day of shutdown is a day in which some form of emergency is more likely to arise. A
recent bestseller by Michael Lewis described the under-appreciated role of federal
government in securing Americans from many under-acknowledged – and often
catastrophic – risks.7)Michael Lewis, The Fifth Risk (W.W. Norton & Co, 2018). That
book, The Fifth Risk, called attention to Trump’s deliberate or reckless non-staffing of
government positions. Yet Lewis’ lessons about the casual necessity of the federal
government, and the alarm we should feel at its incapacitation, apply tellingly to the
government shutdown. Because of the legalistic separation of “essential” versus
“non-essential” services, the shutdown is clearly skewed to impact these long-term,
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or hard-to-appreciate, concerns. A long-term shutdown will clearly cause crisis,
somewhere. And an opportunist Trump, already warming to emergency powers, may
seize on it. (By then, of course, that may not be the greatest of our worries).
These three aspects of the current shutdown – the norm regressions, polarization,
and crisis stakes– all signal a ruthless quest for constitutional destabilization that
goes beyond mere money or borders. Indeed, previous suggestions for averting
shutdowns – budget defaults and other design options – would do little to alleviate
the real exposures now in America’s constitutional system. The big precipice at
present is not fiscal, but constitutional. It suggests a shuttering, not just of American
government, but of American constitutional democracy itself. 
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